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THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT: AWARD REQUIREMENT FOR
STATUTORY ASSIGNMENT OF LONGSHOREMAN'S
THIRD PARTY CLAIM
Workmen's compensation statutes generally assure workmen of quick, certain, medical and disability payments for work-related injuries.' Workmen's
compensation, however, is ordinarily an injured employee's exclusive remedy
against his employer. 2 The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)' follows the exclusive remedy scheme of workmen's
1. See Theriot v. Gulf Oil Corp., 427 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. La. 1976) (Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Act provides remedy to injured workmen to avoid trouble and delay of litigation
process); Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416, 423 (D.D.C. 1964) (Federal Employee's Compensation Act provides government employees with expeditious remedy independent of proof
of fault); Steed v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 355 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. App. 1978) (legislature
intended Florida Workmen's Compensation Act to provide immediate relief for injured workmen
with little delay or deliberation); Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, -,
91 N.W.2d 493, 496
(1958) (injured workmen entitled to limited but certain and adequate compensation without recourse
to litigation under Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act); Naseef v. Cord, Inc., 48 N.J. 317,
-,
225 A.2d 343, 346 n.l (1966) (legislature intended Workmen's Compensation Act to provide quick, dependable financial assistance to injured workmen); Grello v. Daszykowski, 58 A.D.2d
412, 414, 397 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (1977) (New York legislature intended workmen's compensation
act to provide quick, certain, and adequate relief to workmen injured in course of employment),
rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 633, 379 N.E.2d 161 (1978); Humphries
v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 95-96, 135 S.E. 890, 891 (1926) (Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act provides injured workmen with quick and expeditious relief); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 440.01-.60 (West 1981) (Florida Workmen's Compensation Law); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
99 23:1021-:1351 (West 1964) (Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act); MicH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. 99 411.10-.50 (West 1967) (Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34:15-1 to -127 (West 1959) (New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act); N.Y. WORK. CoM.
LAW §§ 1-401 (McKinney 1965) (New York Workmen's Compensation Law); VA. CODE §§ 65.1-1
to -163 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983) (Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act).
2. See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966) (compensation statutes act as
substitute for, rather than supplement to, common law tort action); Gaudet v. Exxon Corp.,
562 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1977) (Congress intended Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act to provide injured worker with compensation benefits in place of potential
recovery in tort action against employer), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1982) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); see also 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)
(1982) (liability of government under Federal Employee's Compensation Act is exclusive and in
place of all other liability to injured government employees); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West
1981) (employer's liability to injured employee exclusive and in place of all other liability); LA.
RE. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1964) (workmen's compensation remedies are exclusive of all
other rights to compensation of injured workman); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 411.40 (West
1967) (workmen's compensation recovery is workman's exclusive remedy against employer); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-7 to -8 (West 1959) (workman choosing workmen's compensation remedy
surrenders all other rights to indemnification against his employer); N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW
§ I1 (McKinney 1965) (employer's liability under workmen's compensation law is exclusive and
in place of any other liability); VA. CODE § 65.1-40 (1980) (employer's payment to employee
of workmen's compensation excludes employee from all other rights and remedies against employer).
3. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), ch. 509, 44 Stat.
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compensation, limiting a stevedore-employer's' total liability for a longshoreman-employee'S5 injuries to fixed compensation payments under the LHWCA.6
The stevedore-employer, however, is not always the party actually responsible
for a longshoreman's injury because of the customary employment pattern
followed by the stevedoring industry. 7 Longshoremen perform a significant
portion of their work, loading or unloading cargo, on third party-owned
vessels. 8 Consequently, a large number of injuries received by longshoremen
occur on third party vessels. 9 Although the stevedore-employer carries
workmen's compensation covering injuries to its employees receive both on
the wharf and on third party vessels,' 0 the employer's LHWCA coverage does
not absolve a negligent shipowner or charterer of liability for a longshoreman's

injury."

1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982)). Congress amended the LHWCA
in 1938, 1959, and again in 1972. See ch. 685, 52 Stat. 1164 (1938 amendment); Pub. L. No.
86-171, 73 Stat. 391 (1959 amendment); Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972 amendment);
infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussion of 1938 and 1959 amendments to § 33(b)
of LHWCA).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1982). Section 2(4) of the LHWCA defines an employer as
any individual or business concern that hires workers for maritime employment in any area
customarily used for loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel. Id. A stevedoring company employs longshoremen to load and unload vessels. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, Tan LAw
oF ADmIRALTY § 6-4, at 251 (1957) (master stevedore or independent contractor, not shipowner,
hires harbor workers).
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982). Section 2(3) of the LHWCA defines an employee as
any person engaged in maritime employment involving longshoring operations or shipbuilding
and repair. Id. A shipmaster or crew member of a vessel, however, is not an employee for purposes of the LHWCA. Id. See generally I M. NoRsus, TiB LAw OF NMAxnnrm PERSONAL INJURIEs
3D §§ 3-8, at 6-16 (3d ed. 1975) (discussion of status of maritime employee as longshoreman
or harbor worker).
6. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1982) (benefits employer pays under LHWCA are exclusive
and in place of all liability of employer to employee); see also Haynes v. Rederi A/S Aladdin,
362 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1966) (Congress intended LHWCA compensation to indemnify injured worker in place of any common law damages against employer), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1020 (1967).
7. See G. GiLMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, § 6-4, at 251 (stevedoring company hires
workers to load or unload vessels owned by third parties).
8. See Ray, The Liability of the Shipownerfor InjuriesAboard Ship to Shoreside Workers
and the Shipowner's Right to Indemnity Against Such Workers' Employers, 27 INs. CooN. J.
642, 642 (1960) (nature of longshoring operations requires longshoremen frequently to work aboard
third party-owned vessels).
9. Id. Ray characterized the merchant vessel as an inherently dangerous work place, thereby
accounting for the frequent occurrence of longshoremen's injuries aboard third party vessels. Id.
10. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1982). The LHWCA covers all accidental injury or death resulting
from or during the course of employment. Id. Additionally, the LHWCA entitles a worker or
his beneficiaries to compensation for injury or death arising out of employment-related diseases
and out of the wilful acts of third persons toward the worker because of the worker's status
as an employee. Id. The LHWCA does not cover injuries which a worker receives as a result
of that worker's intoxication or as a result of that worker's wilful attempt to injure himself or
another person. Id. § 903(b). See generally 1 P. EDELmA, MARTmE INJURY AND DEATH at 265-71
(1960) (discussion of general provisions of LHWCA coverage).
11. See Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, Inc., 618 F.2d 1037, 1042 (4th Cir. 1980) (provi-
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Sections 5 and 33 of the LHWCA permit an injured longshoreman who
receives LHWCA compensation from his employer to pursue a common law
tort action against a third party shipowner for injuries the longshoreman
received as a result of the shipowner's negligence.' 2 If the longshoreman does
not institute proceedings against the shipowner within six months of the
longshoreman's acceptance of LHWCA compensation,' 3 section 33(b) of the
LHWCA automatically assigns to the longshoreman's employer the
longshoreman's right of action against the shipowner. 4 Assignment under section 33(b), however, cannot occur unless the longshoreman received compensation under procedures fulfilling section 33(b)'s requirement of an award in
sions of LHWCA serve to place ultimate burden of liability for longshoreman's injury on company whose fault caused injury); 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(b), 933(a) (1982) (providing injured longshoremen
with remedy against third party tortfeasor).
12. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(b), 933(a) (1982) (providing injured employee with right of indemnity against negligent third party shipowner). Subject to the provisions of § 33(a) of the
LHWCA, § 5(b) of the LHWCA permits an injured longshoreman to recover through a tort
action damages against a negligent third party shipowner or ship charterer. See id. Section 33(a)
of the LHWCA permits an injured longshoreman to both receive LHWVCA compensation from
his employer and pursue a tort action against a negligent third party shipowner. See id. § 933(a).
The LHWCA currently requires actual negligence on the part of the third party shipowner or
charterer before a longshoreman may recover against the third party for injuries the longshoreman
received on board the third party vessel. See id. § 905(b) (longshoremen cannot base actions
against third party shipowners on warranty of seaworthiness or breach thereof). The LHWCA,
however, does not require an injured longshoreman to prove that the third party shipowner's
negligence alone was the cause of the longshoreman's injury. Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521
F.2d 756, 763 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976). Negligence on the part of the
longshoreman's employer, therefore, does not preclude a longshoreman from maintaining an action against a negligent shipowner. Id. Section 5(b), nonetheless, does not permit a longshoreman
to recover against a third party if negligence on the part of the longshoreman's employer alone
caused the longshoreman's injury. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
Prior to the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA that abolished application of the doctrine
of seaworthiness in longshoremen's actions against third parties, a third party shipowner was
liable to the longshoreman for injuries resulting from a vessel's unseaworthiness, regardless of
whether the shipowner was in fact negligent. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85,
94-95 (1946) (longshoremen, like merchant seamen, may maintain action against non-negligent
shipowner to recover damages for unseaworthiness); see also Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 839 (2d Cir. 1977) (Congress intended 1972 amendments to
eliminate doctrine of liability without fault for shipowners); Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263
(1972 amendment to § 5(b) of LHWCA). Under the warranty of seaworthiness, a vessel's owner
has a duty to prepare his vessel, its parts, and equipment reasonably for their purposes. lB BENmicT
oN ADMnIRLTY § 23, at 3-63 (7th ed. 1982); see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539,
550 (1960) (shipowner has duty to furnish vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for intended
use); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) (shipowner must indemnify seaman for injuries seaman
receives as result of general unseaworthiness of vessel or owner's failure to maintain or repair
vessel's necessary equipment). Applying the doctrine of unseaworthiness to longshoremen under
the LHWCA, the Supreme Court in Sieracki transformed the shipowner's duty of reasonable
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel to an absolute duty of liability without fault. See 328
U.S. at 94-95.
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1982) (explicit language of § 33(b) of LHWCA requires acceptance of compensation by longshoreman pursuant to Department of Labor deputy commissioner's
entry of award in compensation order before provisions of § 33(b) operate); infra note 18 and
accompanying text (defining compensation order).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1982). Section 33(b) of the LHWCA provides that a longshoreman's
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a compensation order.' 5 A compensation order is a document concluding an

informal conference" or a formal hearing' 7 on a longshoreman's LHWCA
compensation claim, and contains findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

an order for appropriate relief.18 If the longshoreman's acceptance of comacceptance of LHWCA compensation "under an award in a compensation order filed by the
deputy commissioner" of the Department of Labor or the Department of Labor's Benefits Review
Board operates as an assignment of the longshoreman's third party claim to the longshoreman's
employer. Id. No assignment occurs, however, if the longshoreman pursues his right of action
against the third party within six months of the LHWCA award of compensation. Id.
After assignment, the stevedore-employer may sue the shipowner to recover from the shipowner
any amounts the employer paid to the longshoreman as LHWCA compensation. See id. § 933(d)
(authorizing employer, following assignment under § 33(b), either to recover damages against
third party or to settle tort claim with third party). Following a stevedore-employer's successful
recovery in an action against the third party tortfeasor, the stevedore-employer may apply the
proceeds of the suit to offset any payments made to the longshoreman under LHWCA compensation. See id. § 933(e) (controlling use of proceeds of stevedore-employer's third party suit).
The stevedore-employer also may claim 20% of the balance remaining after covering the
longshoreman's LHWCA payments and must turn over the remaining 80% of the balance to
the longshoreman as supplementary compensation. See id. (controlling stevedore-employer's use
of proceeds from employer's successful third party claim). Under operation of § 33(e) of the
LHWCA, therefore, the longshoreman has a continuing interest in any suit against the third
party tortfeasor even though the longshoreman does not institute the action. See Susino v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 551 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting longshoreman's continued personal interest in stevedore-employer's third party suit).
15. See 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1982) (§ 33(b) allows assignment of third party claim only
after passage of six months from longshoreman's receipt of compensation under award in compensation order).
16. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.301 (1983) (authorizing deputy commissioner to resolve in informal
conferences misunderstandings, clerical or mechanical errors, or mistakes of fact or law pertaining to longshoreman's disputed LHWCA claim). The deputy commissioner conducts informal
conferences in the office of the deputy commissioner without stenographic record or witnesses.
See id. § 702.314. The deputy commissioner concludes any agreement reached through an informal
conference with the drafting of a memorandum embodying the agreement. See id. § 702.315(a)
(memorandum requirement for memorializing agreements reached at informal hearings). Additionally, either party may request that the deputy commissioner enter a formal compensation
order consummating the agreement reached at the informal hearing. See id. (noting option of
compensation order concluding informal conference at request of either party).
17. See id. § 702.301 (formal hearing procedures resolve serious claims disputes). When
a genuine issue of fact or law exists that the deputy commissioner in conference with the parties
cannot dispose of informally, the dispute advances to informal hearings before an administrative
law judge. See id. (genuine dispute of fact or law advances to formal hearing for resolution);
id. § 702.316 (serious dispute at informal conference merits transfer of dispute to hearing before
administrative law judge); see also id. § 702.317 (detailing procedure for transfer of case for
formal hearing). Formal hearings are open to the public, are stenographically reported, and may
include testimony by expert witnesses if necessary. See id. § 702.338, .343 to .344 (detailing formal
hearing procedures). Within 20 days following termination of the formal hearing, the administrative
law judge renders a final decision and order in the form of a formal compensation order rejecting
the longshoreman's LHWCA claim or making an award of benefits. See id. § 702.348 (decision
of administrative law judge embodied in compensation order).
18. See id. (setting forth general contents of compensation order). Following entry of a
formal compensation order concluding either informal conferences or formal hearings, the deputy
commissioner files the order and mails copies to each of the interested parties. See id. § 702.349
(deputy commissioner's procedures for filing and mailing compensation orders). Once filed in
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pensation satisfies the section 33(b) award requirement, 9 and section 33(b)
produces an assignment of the longshoreman's third party claim to the
stevedore-employer, "0 the longshoreman no longer has standing to sue the
shipowner. 2' In longshoremen's actions against shipowners, therefore,
the office of the deputy commissioner, the compensation order becomes effective, binding the
employer or insurance carrier to follow the instructions for compensation, if any, contained in
the compensation order. See id. § 702.350 (finality of compensation orders); see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 914(0 (1982) (employer required to conform to payment procedures embodied in compensation
order or risk penalty). The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board may review the compensation order, but a longshoreman or employer challenging the decision contained in an order
must institute review proceedings within 30 days of the filing of the order in the deputy commissioner's office. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.350 (1983) (application for review of compensation order
required within 30 days of compensation order filing date); see also 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (1982)
(authorizing Benefits Review Board to review compensation orders); id. § 921(b)(1) (establishing
a three-member Benefits Review Board); 20 C.F.R. § 801.201 (1983) (describing composition of
Benefits Review Board). After passage of the review deadline, federal courts have the power
to enforce the compensation order. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(d) (1982) (authorizing federal courts
to enforce compensation orders). The LHWCA places a substantial penalty on an employer who
fails to make payments under the terms of a compensation order. See id. § 914(0 (employer
failing to make LHWCA payments under terms of compensation order within 10 days of payment due date subject to pay employee additional compensation in amount 20% of approved
compensation); cf. id. § 914(e) (employer failing to make payments under terms of agreement
without award within 14 days of payment due date subject to penalty of 10% of approved compensation, payable as additional compensation to employee).
19. See id. § 933(b) (requiring award in compensation order to trigger § 33(b) assignment
provisions); supra note 14 (text of § 33(b) of LHWCA).
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (providing for statutory assignment of employee's third party
claim upon satisfaction of limitation requirements); supra note 14 (text of § 33(b) of LHWCA).
21. See Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 617 F.2d 955, 958 (3d Cir. 1980) (employer
and not employee is real party in interest after assignment of employer's third party claim to
employer), aff'd, 451 U.S. 596 (1981); 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1982) (satisfaction of § 33(b) requirements
results in assignment of employee's third party claim to employer); FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (every
action shall be prosecuted in name of real party in interest).
Prior to the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, if § 33(b) operated to assign a
longshoreman's claim to his employer and the employer failed to pursue the claim, the longshoreman
successfully could argue that the employer's failure to sue permitted reassignment of the claim
to the longshoreman. See Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 532 (1956)
(longshoreman may maintain third party action after assignment of claim to employer upon showing
that conflict of interest caused employer's failure to pursue third party claim); Johnson v. Sword
Line, Inc., 257 F.2d 541, 544 (3d Cir. 1958) (courts may presume conflict of interest to exist
whenever assignee failed to pursue third party claim). But see Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping
Co., 451 U.S. 596, 617-18 (1981) (rejecting claim that conflict of interest resulted in reassignment
of third party claim to employee), aff'g 617 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Susino v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 551 F. Supp. 1080, 1081, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (where one company is both shipowner
and stevedore-employer, actual and demonstrable conflict of interest exists, permitting longshoreman
to sue shipowner even after assignment of third party claim to employer).
The conflict of interest contemplated by courts such as Czaplicki resulted where, for example, the insurance carrier for the shipowner also insured the stevedore-employer, thereby discouraging
the employer from suing the shipowner. See Czaplicki, 351 U.S. at 530 (noting circumstances
of conflict of interest). Although a longshoreman loses his legal interest in a third party claim
following a § 33(b) assignment of the claim to his employer, the longshoreman has a continued
personal interest in the outcome of the employer's suit. See id. at 530-31 (employee has continued
interest in third party claim even after § 33(b) assignment); I M. NoRms, supra note 5, § 97,
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shipowners seeking to avoid liability often argue that section 33(b) automatically
had assigned the longshoreman's claim to the stevedore-employer because some
procedure under which the longshoreman received LHWCA compensation constituted a proper award for purposes of section 33(b). 22 Courts hearing such
an argument consequently must determine whether the longshoreman received
compensation in a manner sufficient to satisfy section 33(b)'s requirement of
order triggering the six-month limitation period
an award in a compensation
23
leading to assignment.
Confusion often has arisen concerning satisfaction of the section 33(b)
award requirement because several avenues exist by which a longshoreman
may receive LHWCA compensation. 2" A longshoreman may receive LHWCA
at 176 (operation of § 33(e) of LHWCA results in continued personal interest of employee in
third party claim after § 33(b) assignment of claim to employer); see also 33 U.S.C. § 933(e)
(1982) (employee entitled to certain percentage of employer's recovery from third party tortfeasor);
supra note 14 (detailing operation of § 33(e)). When a conflict of interest exists between an employer
and employee resulting in the employer's inaction on a third party claim, the employer's failure
to sue the third party defeats the employee's interest in any potential recovery. See Czaplicki,
351 U.S. at 531 (noting effect of employer's failure to sue third party). The Czaplicki conflict
of interest exception to § 33(b) assignment, therefore, permitted the employee to bring a third
party action after assignment on the ground that the employee was the only party with sufficient
adverse interest to maintain the action. Id.
The Supreme Court, in Rodriguez, rejected the reassignment argument, ruling that once
§ 33(b) results in an assignment of an employee's third party claim, the employee loses the claim
irrevocably to his employer. 451 U.S. at 603. The Rodriguez Court reasoned that an employer's
failure to bring a third party action following assignment is a risk an employee must consider
in the employee's decision whether to pursue the third party claim before assignment. Id. at 613-14.
The Rodriguez Court, however, declined to resolve whether § 33(b) assignment barred a
longshoreman's third party suit in the event of a very serious conflict of interest. Id. at 618.
22. See, e.g., Rodrigttez v. Compass Shipping Co., 617 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant shipowner argued longshoreman's lack of standing as real party in interest due to assignment of longshoreman's claim to employer after longshoreman's receipt of compensation pursuant to settlement agreement), aff'd, 451 U.S. 596 (1981); Hall v. International Union Lines,
Inc., 552 F. Supp. 816, 817 (E.D. La. 1982) (defendant shipowner moved for dismissal of
longshoreman's action on ground that longshoreman's third party claim assigned to employer
by virtue of longshoreman's acceptance of compensation without award); Rother v. Interstate
& Ocean Transport Co., 540 F. Supp. 477, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (defendant shipowner alleged
that plaintiff employee not real party in interest because employee brought suit more than six
months after receipt of LHWCA payments, resulting in § 33(b) assignment of employee's third
party claim); Collier v. John Mendis, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 459, 459 (D.D.C. 1981) (defendant ship
charterer entered motion for summary judgment on ground that § 33(b) assigned employee's
claim to employer after passage of six months from time employee received LHWCA compensation); Larson v. Associated Container Transp. Ltd., 459 F. Supp. 561, 562 (E.D. Va. 1978) (defendant shipowner moved for summary judgment on ground that § 33(b) assigned longshoreman's
claim to employer following passage of six months from longshoreman's receipt of compensation).
23. See, e.g., Simmons v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 676 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1982) (issue
in § 33(b) assignment question is whether certain events create award in compensation order suf(1983);
U.S. ficient to trigger six month limitation period), vacated and remanded, Hall v. International Union Lines, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 816, 817 (E.D. La. 1982) (§ 33(b) assignment issue is whether longshoreman received compensation under award in compensation order
as § 33(b) requires); Larson v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 459 F. Supp. 561, 562 (E.D.
Va. 1978) (determination of § 33(b) assignment issue dependent on when and if award was made).
24. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 702.231-.350 (1983) (procedures for resolving longshoremen's
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compensation through his employer's voluntary payment of benefits, which
the employer must begin within fourteen days of initial notification of the
longshoreman's injury.'- When an employer disputes its LHWCA liability or
a longshoreman contests his employer's reduction, suspension or termination
of benefits, however, a series of adjudicative procedures commences. 26 If the
dispute is minor the deputy commissioner for the longshoreman's compensation district 27 will hear the dispute in an informal conference21 and issue a
memorandum embodying the compensation agreement, 29 or if either the
longshoreman or stevedore-employer requests, issue a formal compensation
LHWCA claims); supra notes 17 & 18 (describing adjudication of LHWCA claims in informal
hearings or formal conferences); see also supra note 18 (discussing contents and effect of award
in compensation order).
25. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.231 (1983) (employer must pay LHWCA benefits unless employer
disputes employee's LHWCA claim); id. § 702.232 (first compensation payment to longshoreman
due on 14th day after employer has knowledge of longshoreman's injury or death). Upon the
initiation of voluntary LHWCA payments, or in the event the employer later terminates payments,
federal regulations require the employer to file with the deputy commissioner notice of either
commencement or termination of payments. See id. § 702.234 (requiring employer to file commencement and suspension notices with deputy commissioner). The official administrative forms
for notice of commencement or suspension of LHWCA payments are Form LS-206-Payment
of Compensation Without Award and Form LS-208-Compensation Payment Stopped or Sus-'
pended. See Pallas Shipping Agency v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529, 531 (1983) (noting official forms
required for notice of commencement or suspension of LHWCA payments). Payment of compensation without award under Form LS-206 signifies that the employer has agreed to pay the
injured longshoreman LHWCA benefits without having disputed the longshoreman's right to
compensation. Id. at 532.
Federal regulations permit an employer and employee to settle claims independent of the
LHWCA claims process. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.241(a) (1983) (authorizing agreed settlements between longshoreman and employer with approval of deputy commissioner). A deputy commissioner, however, must approve all agreed settlements that discharge the liabilities of the employer
for LHWCA compensation. See id. (deputy commissioner must approve agreed settlements between employer and employee); id. § 702.241(b) (interested parties must apply for approval of
agreed settlements in writing to deputy commissioner); id. § 702.241(c) (deputy commissioner
must file compensation order making necessary findings of fact prior to approving settlement
discharging employer from LHWCA liability). Federal regulations permit agreed settlements, notwithstanding provisions of § 15(b) and § 16 of the LHWCA, which prohibit settlements discharging an employer from LHWCA liability. Id. § 702.241(a); see 33 U.S.C. §§ 915(b), 916 (1982)
(prohibiting settlements discharging employers from LHWCA liability).
26. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.251-.252 (1983) (deputy commissioner commences proceedings for
adjudication of claim following employer's notice of dispute of employee's claim to LHWCA
benefits); id. § 702.301 (deputy commissioner settled minor claims disputes through informal
conferences and administrative law judge decides major disputes through formal hearings).
27. See id. § 702.101 (establishing 18 specific compensation districts); id. § 702.212 (requiring injured longshoreman to file compensation claims with deputy commissioner of compensation district where injury occurred).
28. See id. § 702.301 (deputy commissioner has authority to resolve minor LHWCA disputes
through informal conferences). Minor LHWCA claims disputes usually involve clerical or mechanical
errors, misunderstandings between the parties, or mistakes of fact or law. See id. (noting common subject matter of minor LHWCA disputes); supra note 16 (detailing informal conference
process).
29. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.315(a) (1983) (memorandum required memorializing agreements
reached at informal conferences).

1492

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1485

order. 31 If, however, the conflict involves a major claim dispute, an administrative law judge will resolve the dispute in a formal hearing3 ' and will render

a final decision and order of compensation payment, if any, in a formal compensation order. 32 The longshoreman, therefore, may receive voluntary
LHWCA benefits payments or ordered LHWCA compensation through the

memorandum or compensation order consummating an informal conference
3
or through the compensation order concluding a formal hearing.
Although section 33(b)'s compensation order requirement implicitly limits
the operation of section 33(b) to disputed claims 34 since compensation orders

ordinarily follow only claims disputes resolved in either informal conferences
or formal hearings, 35 at least one court, until recently, has applied section
33(b) to a longshoreman's acceptance of compensation that his stevedoreemployer paid voluntarily without an award. 36 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a series of cases, held that a section 33(b)

assignment does not require a formal award in a compensation order but merely
requires payment and acceptance of compensation. 37 For example, in Simmons
30. See id. (noting option of compensation order concluding informal conference); supra

note 18 (discussing nature and significance of compensation orders).
31. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.301 (1983) (genuine dispute of fact or law advances to formal
hearings for resolution); id. § 702.316 (serious dispute of informal conference merits transfer
of dispute to hearing before administrative law judge); supra note 1 (detailing formal hearings
process); see also 20 C.F.R. § 702.317 (1983) (detailing procedure for transfer of case for formal
hearing).
32. See id. § 702.348 (decision of administrative law judge embodied in compensation order);
supra note 18 (discussing nature and significance of compensation orders).
33. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (discussing various processes for LHWCA
claims resolution).
34. See Pallas Shipping Agency v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529, 534 (1983) (compensation order
is administrative award of compensation following proceedings with respect to claim). But see
id. at 538 (interpreting 20 C.F.R. § 702.315(a) as authorizing employer making voluntary compensation payments to obtain compensation order upon consent of all interested parties); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 702.315(a) (1983) (authorizing deputy commissioner to enter compensation order
concluding informal conference upon request for either party).
35. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.315(a) (1983) (authorizing option of compensation order concluding
informal conference at request of either longshoreman or employer); id. § 702.348 (administrative
law judge embodies formal hearing decision in compensation order).
36. See Simmons v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 676 F.2d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1982) (longshoreman's
acceptance of payments without formal award of benefits sufficient to trigger § 33(b) assignment
provisions), vacated and remanded, U.S. (1983); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta
& Co., 564 F.2d 1097, 1103 (4th Cir. 1977) (longshoreman's acceptance of voluntary payments

and employer's filing of notice of commencement of payment sufficient to trigger § 33(b) sixmonth limitation); see also Larson v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 459 F. Supp. 561,
564 (E.D. Va. 1978) (longshoreman's mere acceptance of compensation and employer's filing
of commencement of payment notice triggered § 33(b) assignment provisions).
37. See Simmons v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 676 F.2d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1982) (mere acceptance of compensation sufficient to trigger assignment under § 33(b)); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea
Transp., Inc., 618 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (4th Cir. 1980) (acceptance of compensation without award
by deputy commissioner triggers § 33(b) assignment provision); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta
& Co., 564 F.2d 1097, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977) (mere acceptance of compensation without award
sufficient to trigger § 33(b) assignment). But cf. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1982) (requiring deputy
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v. Sea-Land Services, Inc. ' 8 the Fourth Circuit suggested that a requirement
of a formal award would frustrate the LHWCA's purpose of providing quick
and fully adequate relief to an injured longshoreman. 39 The Simmons court
explained that a stevedore-employer desiring to preserve its future right to
pursue a third party claim would have to dispute every longshoreman's
LHWCA claim in order to force the adjudication proceedings necessary to
produce an award in a compensation order. 4 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
commissioner to file award in compensation order for operation of § 33(b) six-month limitation
leading to automatic assignment); supra note 14 (text of § 33(b)).
The Fourth Circuit, in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., decided that a § 33(b)
assignment does not require a formal award but merely payment and acceptance of LHWCA
compensation. 564 F.2d at 1102. In Liberty Mutual, the Fourth Circuit considered the claim
of an employer's insurance carrier that an assignment of a longshoreman's third party claim
to the longshoreman's employer entitled the insurance carrier to bring suit against the third party
tortfeasor. Id. at 1101; see 33 U.S.C. § 933(h) (1982) (subrogating employer's claim against third
party tortfeasor to employer's insurance carrier when carrier assumes payment of LHWCA compensation). The third party shipowner countered the insurance carrier's claim, arguing that the
longshoreman's receipt of his employer's voluntarily compensation payments without a formal
award did not result in an assignment of the longshoreman's third party claim. 564 F.2d at 1101.
The lack of an assignment, argued the shipowner, precluded the insurance carrier from suing
on the longshoreman's right of action. Id. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the shipowner,
noting two cases decided prior to the 1959 amendment of § 33(b) as illustrating a broad definition
of the term "award" for purposes of § 33(b). Id. at 1102; see Grasso v. Lorentzen, 56 F. Supp.
51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (holding that affirmative act or determination by deputy commissioner
meets assignment requirements of § 33(b)), aff'd, 149 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
743 (1945); Didier v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 15 F. Supp. 91, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1936)
(holding that compensation order in LHWCA § 21(a) means any order relating to compensation).
Relying on Grasso and Didier, the Liberty Mutual court focused on acts of ratification of compensation, whether formal or informal, and the longshoreman's subsequent acceptance of compensation as primary indicators of an award within the § 33(b) requirement. 564 F.2d at 1102.
The Liberty Mutual court determined that the employer's filing of LHWCA compensation
documents and the subsequent grant of benefits to the longshoreman constituted sufficient ratification and acceptance to produce an award in a compensation order without entry of a formal
award. Id. at 1103. In Liberty Mutual, the employer filed with the deputy commissioner Form
BEC-202-Employer's First Report of Accident or Occupational Illness, Form BEC-206-Payment
of Compensation Without Award, Form No. 6-Attending Physician's Report, and Form
BEC-208-Compensation Payment Stopped or Suspended. Id. at 1101 n.10.
The Fourth Circuit strengthened Liberty Mutual's effect on Fourth Circuit jurisprudence
in Simmons v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., which set forth three specific events necessary to constitute
an award sufficient to trigger the § 33(b) assignment provision. 676 F.2d at 109. The Simmons
court required as a minimum that the employer voluntarily offer compensation payments to the
longshoreman, that the deputy commissioner file appropriate LHWCA notice documents, and
that the longshoreman accept any LHWCA payments. Id. The Simmons court noted that the
three events combined to create an award triggering the § 33(b) six-month limitation independent
of a formal award in a compensation order. Id.
(1983).
U.S. __
38. 676 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 39. See 676 F.2d at 109 (formal award requirement operates indirectly to hinder purpose
of LHWCA to provide speedy relief to injured employees); see also Liberty Mutual, 564 F.2d
at 1103 (award requirement obstructs purpose of LHWCA to provide longshoremen with quick,
adequate relief).
40. See 676 F.2d at 109 (suggesting that requirement of formal award creates need for
employer's mechanical dispute of employee's LHWCA claim to force award in compensation
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that the six-month limitation under section 33(b) provided the longshoreman

with sufficient time to consider his option to pursue an action against a third
party tortfeasor.4 ' The Simmons court concluded that the six-month limitation served as an adequate safeguard of the longshoreman's rights under the

LHWCA in the place of a formal award requirement. 2

The United States Supreme Court, however, in PallasShipping Agency,

Ltd. v. Duris,"I explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's rule that mere acceptance of LHWCA compensation and the routine filing of compensation forms
constitute an award triggering the running of the section 33(b) six-month
limitation." In Pallas Shipping, a longshoreman received injuries while performing work aboard a chartered vessel. 5 The longshoreman for nearly two
years accepted compensation payments made without contest by the long-

shoreman's employer.

6

Upon termination of LHWCA benefits, the

longshoreman attempted to recover further compensation from the third party

ship charterer.47 Although no formal compensation order existed, the charterer

argued that section 33(b)'s assignment provision barred the longshoreman's
claim"0 since the longshoreman's acceptance of compensation payments and

the employer's routine filing of administrative forms 9 constituted an award
in a compensation order for purposes of section 33(b).10 The charterer contended that the passage of six months following the award created an assignment of the longshoreman's third party claim to the longshoreman's employer,
order guaranteeing operation of § 33(b) six-month limitation); Liberty Mutual, 564 F.2d at 1103
(employers must dispute every LHWCA claim to force entry of formal award under § 33(b) award
requirement). The Liberty Mutual court suggested that an employer's challenge of LHWCA claims
to preserve the employee's § 33(a) assignment rights would result in needless delay at the expense
of the longshoreman. 564 F.2d at 1103.
41. See Simmons, 676 F.2d at 109 (six-month limitation period provides longshoreman with
sufficient time to consider his options to compensation).
42. See id. (six-month limitation serves as protection to longshoremen). The Simmons court's
reasoning that the § 33(b) six-month limitation adequately safeguards a longshoreman's rights
in the absence of an award in a compensation order demonstrates a § 33(b) interpretation that
ignores the significance of the 1938 amendment to § 33(b) that added the requirement of an
award in a compensation order. See id. (six-month limitation affords longshoremen adequate
protection of rights, thereby implicitly eliminating need for award in compensation order); Act
of June 25, 1938, ch. 685, § 12, 52 Stat. 1164, 1168 (1938 amendment to § 33(b)); infra note
67 and accompanying text (discussing nature and significance of 1938 amendment to § 33(b)).
43. 461 U.S. 529 (1983).
44. Id.at 532.
45. Id.at 531.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 534.
49. See id. In PallasShipping, the deputy commissioner filed Form LS-206-Payment of
Compensation Without Award, and Form LS-208-Compensation of Payment Stopped or Suspended. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 914(c) (1982) (requiring that employer file notice forms with deputy
commissioner to notify Department of Labor of commencement or suspension of LHWCA compensation); 20 C.F.R. § 702.234 (1983) (requiring notification to deputy commissioner of commencement or suspension of LHWCA payments).
50. 461 U.S. at 534.
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barring the longshoreman from pursuing a third party
action instituted two
5
years after the longshoreman received the award'.
The Pallas Shipping Court rejected the charterer's argument, ruling that
no assignment of the longshoreman's third party claim occurred.- 2 The Pallas
Shipping Court recognized that the plain language of section 33(b) requires
a longshoreman's acceptance of an award in a compensation order filed by
the deputy commissioner before section 33(b) operates to assign the
longshoreman's third party claim to his employer." The Court noted that a
compensation order is an administrative compensation award concluding a
LHWCA claims proceeding. 4 The PallasShipping Court emphasized that since
the employer in Pallas Shipping made voluntary LHWCA payments, 55 not
only had no claims proceedings taken place, but no official had entered a
compensation order. 6 The Court, therefore, rejected the charterer's argument
that mere acceptance of voluntary LHWCA payments triggered section 33(b)
assignment.5
The Pallas Shipping Court then reasoned that the employer's filing of
required administrative compensation forms did not satisfy the section 33(b)
requirement of an award in a compensation order. 8 The Court noted that
59
administrative filings are distinct from compensation orders in several respects.
First, the Court stated that both the deputy commissioner and administrative
law judges issue compensation orders, but not administrative forms. 6 Second,
the Court maintained that unlike administrative filings, compensation orders
are administratively reviewable and judicially enforceable. 6' Finally, the Court
stated that an employer failing to comply with the terms of a compensation
order faces a more substantial penalty than an employer failing to meet the
voluntary payments set in the administrative forms. 62 The PallasShipping Court
added that no part of the LHWCA suggested a construction of the term "com63
pensation order" to include administrative filings.

51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1982) (requiring longshoreman to receive award in compensation order before assignment provisions of § 33(b) operate); supra note 14 (text of § 33(b)).
54. 461 U.S. at 534; see supra note 18 (detailing nature and significance of compensation
orders).
55. 461 U.S. at 531.
56. Id. at 534.

57. Id. at 539.
58. Id. at 534.
59. Id.

60. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.315 (1983) (deputy commissioner prepares compensation order
following informal conference if parties request order); id. § 702.348 (administrative law judge
prepares compensation order following formal hearings).
61. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1982) (Benefits Review Board may review compensation orders);
id. § 921(d) (federal courts have power to enforce compensation orders).
62. See supra note 18 (comparing penalties for employer's failure to comply with either
administrative filings or compensation order).
63. 461 U.S. at 535.
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The Pallas Shipping Court next reasoned that the legislative history of
section 33(b) precluded any interpretation of the statute that disregarded the

requirement of an award in a compensation order." ' The original language
of section 33(b) made mere receipt of compensation payments in any form
and at any stage of compensation proceedings an automatic assignment to
the longshoreman's employer of the longshoreman's right of action against

a third party shipowner. 6 Aware of problems inherent in the immediate assignment provision of the 1927 version of section 33(b), 66 Congress in 1938 amended
section 33(b) by adding an award clause that limited immediate assignment

to those situations in which a longshoreman accepted compensation under an
award in a compensation order issued by a deputy commissioner. 67 Congress
64. Id. at 535-38.
65. See Act of Mar. 4, 1927, § 33, 44 Stat. 1424, 1440 (original version of § 33 of LHWCA).
The 1927 version of § 33(b) assigned the employee's third party claim to the employer as soon
as the employee accepted LHWCA compensation. Id. Assignment occurred regardless of whether
the employee had notified the deputy commissioner of the employee's election to receive LHWCA
compensation rather than to pursue a third party claim. Id.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1945, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1938) (1938 amendment will remove
problems in operation of § 33(b)). Congress noted that under the 1927 enactment of the LHWCA,
§ 33(b) operated to treat unjustly an employee who lost his right of action against a third party
tortfeasor because the employee accepted compensation without fully understanding the effect
such acceptance would have upon his rights to further indemnification. Id. Congress reasoned
that an award requirement in § 33(b) would provide employees with the opportunity to carefully
consider the option of whether to accept compensation under an award or refuse compensation
to pursue a third party action. Id.; see ProposedAmendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' CompensationAct: Hearingson H.R. 8293 before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (statement of Lewis Dalby, chief counsel for the United States
Employment Compensation Commission) (discussing merit of proposed award requirement). Dalby,
in his report to the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, commented that employees often accept compensation without realizing how acceptance affects their rights to further indemnification from
third party tortfeasors. Id. Dalby explained that the process of formal hearing and issuance of
an award would operate to inform the employee of his rights beyond LHWCA compensation.
Id. Dalby suggested that an award requirement was necessary to prevent an employee from unknowingly losing his rights against third parties by acceptance of compensation that the employer or
insurance carrier offered to the employee immediately upon notice of the injury. Id.
67. See Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 685, § 12, 52 Stat. 1164, 1168 (1938 amendment to §
33(b)). Under the 1938 amendment, an employee's acceptance of LHWCA compensation under
an award in a compensation order filed by a deputy commissioner automatically assigned to the
employer any rights the employee had against a third party tortfeasor. Id. The 1938 amendment
permitted a longshoreman accepting compensation without an award to maintain a tort action
against a third party shipowner. Id.; see 1 M. Noams, supra note 5, § 95, at 172 (1938 amendment required some official action by deputy commissioner explicitly establishing compensation
award before employee's acceptance of compensation operated as assignment of employee's third
party claim to employer). When a deputy commissioner granted a longshoreman LHWCA compensation under an award in a compensation order, however, the 1938 version of § 33(b) continued to require an injured longshoreman to elect whether to accept compensation under an
award, with a resulting immediate assignment of his third party claim to the stevedore-employer,
or to reject LHWCA compensation completely in order to pursue independently an action against
the shipowner. See Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 685, § 12, 52 Stat. 1164, 1168 (1938 amendment
continued to require election of remedies for longshoreman's receipt of compensation under award
in compensation order); see also Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74, 79 (1980)
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again amended section 33(b) in 1959 by adding a six-month limitation provision which effectively authorized a longshoreman both to receive compensation under an award in a compensation order and to pursue within six months
8
of receipt of compensation a tort action against the third party shipowner.'
The PallasShipping Court noted that the 1938 amendment's requirement
of an award in a compensation order served to inform a longshoreman of
the full extent of his rights to compensation.6 9 The Court explained that Congress intended a formal award requirement to protect injured longshoremen
from any unexpected loss of rights against third party tortfeasors and to enable
longshoremen to make informed elections of remedies.7" The PallasShipping
Court emphasized, however, that Congress made no indication that the 1959
amendment was to supersede the 1938 amendment's award requirement. 7 '
Rather, the Pallas Shipping Court noted that Congress intended the pre-1959
judicial construction of those phrases of section 33(b) retained under the 1959
amendment to continue. 2 The Pallas Shipping Court recognized the pre-1959
construction of the 1938 award requirement to permit statutory assignment
after a longshoreman accepted nothing less than an award of compensation
by the deputy commissioner.13 In the Pallas Shipping Court's opinion,
therefore, the legislative history of section 33(b) did not support an interpretation of section 33(b) which, on the basis of the 1959 six-month limitation
amendment, disregarded the 1938 amendment's award requirement.74

(under 1938 amendment, § 33(b) required no election of remedies unless employer paid compensation pursuant to award in compensation order).
68. See Act of Aug. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-171, 73 Stat. 391, 391 (1959 amendment
to § 33(b)). In the 1959 amendment to § 33(b), Congress added a phrase making automatic assignment of the longshoreman's claim conditional on the passage of six months after the longshoreman's
receipt of an award in a compensation order. Id.; see Pallas Shipping Agency v. Duris, 461 U.S.
529, 537 (1983) (1959 amendment allows longshoreman both to receive compensation in award
in compensation order and to pursue third party claim within six months of award). Congress
intended the 1959 amendment to § 33(b) to provide longshoremen with an increased ability to
receive fully adequate indemnification for the longshoreman's injury. See S. REP. No. 428, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1959 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 2134, 2134-35 (amendment
adding six-month limitation period allows employee to bring third party claim without forfeiting
right to LHWCA compensation). The Senate noted that the 1938 version of § 33(b) caused hardship for an injured longshoreman because the statute effectively operated to force the employee
immediately to elect LHWCA compensation rather than to face the uncertainty and expense involved in an independent third party claim. Id.
69. 461 U.S. at 536.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 537 (Congress demonstrated no intent to alter prerequisites of award in compensation order for proper assignment); 105 CONG. REc. 9226 (1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (1959 amendment necessitates no change in current judicial construction of retained phrases
of 1938 version of § 33(b)).
72. See 461 U.S. at 537 (noting congressional intent in passage of 1959 amendment to § 33(b)).
73. Id. at 536-37; see American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 454-56 (1947)
(representing pre-1959 construction of § 33(b) that mere acceptance of compensation benefits
does not trigger immediate assignment under § 33(b)).
74. 461 U.S. at 537.
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The PallasShipping Court, supporting the continued vitality of the 1938
amendment's award requirement, reasoned that the requirement of an award
in a formal compensation order still serves the 1938 amendment's original
75
basic legislative purpose of protecting the interests of injured longshoremen.
The Court explained that a formal award places the longshoreman on certain
notice that he has six months to pursue an action against a third party.76 The
Court added that a formal award apprises a longshoreman of the final, fixed
amount of LHWCA compensation to which he is entitled, enabling the
longshoreman to make a well-informed decision on whether to sue the third
party tortfeasor."1 Responding to the argument that the award requirement
encourages employers mechanically to dispute all LHWCA claims in order
to force proceedings necessary to produce an award in a compensation order, 8
the Pallas Shipping Court suggested that under current federal regulations,
an employer making voluntary benefits payments can request entry of a compensation order with the longshoreman's consent." 9 The Court also noted that
an employer can pursue a third party action for payments the employer made
to the longshoreman even absent a section 33(b) assignment of the
longshoreman's third party claim. 80 The Pallas Shipping Court, finding no
persuasive arguments for disregarding the section 33(b) award requirement,
concluded that acceptance of voluntary compensation payments without a compensation award was not sufficient to trigger the section 33(b) assignment
provision."
The Supreme Court decided Pallas Shipping on the limited question of
whether mere acceptance of compensation paid voluntarily triggers the sixmonth limitation and subsequent assignment provisions of section 33(b).12 The
75. Id. at 537-38.
76. Id. at 538.
77. Id.

78. See Simmons v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 676 F.2d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1982) (suggesting
that strict adherence to § 33(b) award requirement encourages employers to challenge automatically
all longshoremen's LHWCA claims), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3079 (1983); Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co. 564 F.2d 1097, 1103 (4th Cir. 1977) (formal award requirement
forces employer to dispute every LHWCA claim in order to force proceedings necessary to produce compensation order); supra notes 39-40 (discussing Fourth Circuit's argument that award
requirement encourages employers' perfunctory challenge of employees' LHWCA claims).
79. 461 U.S. at 538; see 20 C.F.R. § 702.315(a) (1983) (authorizing deputy commissioner
to enter compensation order concluding informal conference upon request of either party).
80. 461 U.S. at 538; see Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394
U.S. 404, 412-13 (1969) (nothing in language of § 33 or in legislative history of LHWCA limits
employer's remedy against third party tortfeasors to subrogation to the longshoreman's third
party claim). The Burnside Court noted that federal maritime law recognizes that a shipowner
has a duty of care under the circumstances, which, if breached by the shipowner's negligence,
provides a longshoreman's employer a direct tort action to recover the amount of LHWCA payments
that the employer made to the longshoreman. 394 U.S. at 415; see Crescent Wharf & Warehouse
Co. v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 696 F.2d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming continued use of
the Burnside cause of action).
81. 461 U.S. at 539.
82. Id. at 531. In PallasShipping, the Court specifically stated that the Court granted certiorari to resolve an inter-circuit conflict between the Fourth and Sixth Circuit. See id.; compare
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Supreme Court did not explicitly consider the question of whether acceptance
of compensation plus some functional equivalent of an actual award in a compensation order would trigger the section 33(b) six-month limitation. 3
Nonetheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
considered the question of functional equivalency in two major section 33(b)
decisions, Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co." in 1980 and Verderame v.
Torm Lines85 in 1982.86
In Rodriguez, the Second Circuit examined whether a settlement agreement between a longshoreman and stevedore-employer constituted an award
in a compensation order triggering the section 33(b) assignment provision.87
In Rodriguez, a longshoreman received injuries while unloading a third partyowned and chartered vessel. 88 The longshoreman filed a LHWCA claim against
his employer.8 9 A claims examiner in an informal conference with both the
longshoreman and the stevedore-employer reached an agreement settling the
longshoreman's claim.9 ' The parties executed a written agreement that finalized
the extent of the longshoreman's disability, the amount of compensation due
the longshoreman, and the amount of the longshoreman's attorneys' fees. 9'
Although federal regulations at the time of the agreement required the claims
92
examiner to file a compensation order following an informal conference,
the claims examiner failed to do so. 9' Soon after the agreement, the
Duris v. Erato Shipping, Inc., 684 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1982) (mere receipt of LHWCA compensation without formal award does not trigger § 33(b) six-month limitation period leading to
assignment), aff'd sub. nom. Pallas Shipping Agency v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529 (1983) with Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F.2d 1097, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977) (mere acceptance of compensation without award sufficient to trigger six-month limitation leading to assignment under
§ 33(b)).
83. See 461 U.S. at 539 (PallasShipping Court explicitly held that longshoreman's acceptance of voluntary compensation payments not sufficient to constitute award in compensation
order triggering § 33(b) six-month limitation).
84. 617 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 596 (1981); see supra
note 21 (discussing grounds on which Supreme Court affirmed Rodriguez).
85. 670 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982).
86. See id. at 7 (setting forth requirements meeting functional equivalent of award in compensation order); Rodriguez, 617 F.2d at 959 (decision that official action meeting purpose of
formal award is sufficient to trigger § 33(b) assignment creates rule of functional equivalency).
87. 617 F.2d at 958.
88. Id. at 956-57.
89. Id. at 957.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.315 (1983) (requiring deputy commissioner to file compensation
order following informal conferences). But see id. § 702.315(a) (making compensation order optional following informal conferences).
93. 617 F.2d at 957. The Rodriguez court determined that the federal regulations existing
prior to the September 9, 1977 amendments to the Code of Federal Regulations applied to the
claims in Rodriguez because the causes of action under consideration accrued before 1977. Id.
at 960 n.2. The Rodriguez court, however, suggested that a different outcome might result under
application of federal regulations as amended in 1977. Id. The Second Circuit in Ambrosino
v. TransoceanicS.S. Co., resolved the uncertainty of the effect of the 1977 amendments on the
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longshoreman's employer paid to the longshoreman the compensation due
under the agreement. 94 Three and one half years after execution of the agreement, the longshoreman brought suit against the owner and charterer of the
vessel aboard which the longshoreman received his injuries." The defendants
contended that the settlement agreement between the longshoreman and his
employer amounted to a compensation order for purposes of section 33(b).96
The defendants, accordingly, motioned for summary judgment on the grounds
that the longshoreman's failure to bring a third party suit within the six-month
limitation of section 33(b) barred the longshoreman from later maintaining
an action against the defendants. 9"
The Rodriguez court accepted the defendants' contention that the settlement agreement constituted a section 33(b) compensation order, reasoning that,
although the settlement agreement did not constitute a formal award per se,
the settlement agreement fulfilled the function of an award in a compensation
order. 98 The Rodriguez court explained that a compensation order serves to
notify a longshoreman of the full extent of his rights, including the right to
sue a third party tortfeasor within six months of the longshoreman's acceptance of compensation under a compensation order. 99 The Second Circuit suggested that under the settlement agreement, the longshoreman was fully aware
of his rights to the same extent the longshoreman would have been aware
of his rights had the claims examiner filed a compensation order."' 0 The Second Circuit added that the claims examiner's failure to comply with the federal
regulations compensation order requirement" ° ' should have no significance concerning the substantive rights of the parties when a compensation agreement
already effectively established those rights.10 2 The Rodriguez court concluded
that because the settlement agreement fulfilled the function of an award in
a compensation order, the settlement agreement triggered the six-month limitation leading to an assignment under section 33(b). 0 3
Rodriguez decision. See 675 F.2d 470, 472 (2d Cir. 1982) (under revised federal regulations, agreement embodied in memorandum of informal conference still constitutes award in compensation
order for purposes of § 33(b)).
94. 617 F.2d at 957.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 957-58.
97. Id. at 957.
98. Id. at 959.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.315 (1983) (requiring deputy commissioner to enter compensation
order concluding informal conferences).
102. 617 F.2d at 959.
103. Id. at 959-60. The Rodriguez court did not specifically use the term "functional
equivalent" in its decision, but functional equivalency describes the Rodriguez rule. See id. at
959 (actions of parties meeting purpose but not form of compensation order requirement sufficient to trigger § 33(b) six-month limitation period); Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 456
F. Supp. 1014, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (informal equivalent of compensation order sufficient to
trigger § 33(b) assignment provisions), aff'd, 617 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds,
451 U.S. 596 (1981).
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The Rodriguez court utilized the functional equivalency argument essentially to ensure that a simple administrative lapse would not govern the substantive rights of the parties when a settlement agreement fully established those
rights. 4 The Second Circuit in Verderame v. Torm Lines" expanded the
Rodriguez decision by allowing section 33(b) assignment whenever some official procedure fixed the substantive rights of the parties, without regard for
the particular circumstances underlying the absence of a compensation order.' 6
The Verderame court considered whether a longshoreman's acceptance of interim payments prior to a settlement of the longshoreman's LHWCA claim
triggered the six-month limitation provision in section 33(b).1 -7 In Verderame,
the longshoreman filed a LHWCA claim against his employer following injuries the longshoreman received aboard a third party vessel.'0I The employer's
insurance carrier paid to the longshoreman interim payments of compensation until the longshoreman and his employer reached an agreement and
stipulation.'0 9 Prior to the agreement and accompanying compensation order," 0
however, the longshoreman had filed suit against the third party shipowner,
seeking damages for the longshoreman's injury."' The defendant shipowner
subsequently contended that the longshoreman's acceptance of interim compensation one and one half years prior to the longshoreman's suit triggered
the six-month limitation of section 33(b)." 2 Arguing that section 33(b) operated
to assign the longshoreman's third party claim to the longshoreman's employer,
the defendant successfully motioned for summary judgment." 3
On appeal, the Verderame court acknowledged that Congress intended
section 33(b) to provide a longshoreman with six months in which to make
a well-considered decision whether to pursue an action against a third party
tortfeasor after the longshoreman was apprised completely of his rights to
compensation.' The Second Circuit reasoned that a longshoreman cannot
make a fully informed decision to sue until the longshoreman knows the full
extent of his injuries and the full amount of compensation to which the
LHWCA entitles him.115 The Second Circuit determined that no assignment
can occur under section 33(b) until a compensation order, stipulation of the
parties," 6 or informal award fixes the amount of the longshoreman's LHWCA
104. See 617 F.2d at 959 (administrative lapse can have no legal significance concerning
substantive rights of interested parties).
105. 670 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982).
106. See id. at 7 (§ 33(b) assignment provisions begin to operate when order, stipulation
of parties, or informal award fixes longshoreman's LHWCA benefits).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.241(c) (1983) (requiring deputy commissioner to file compensation
order approving settlement between employer and employee).
111. 670 F.2d at 6.
112. Id.
113. Id.

114. Id. at 7.
115. Id.
116. See 20 C.F.R. § 702.241(a) (1983) (permitting agreed settlements, or stipulations, on
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compensation." 7 The Verderame court, therefore, rejected the defendant

shipowner's contention that interim compensation payments constituted the
equivalent of an award for purposes of a section 33(b) assignment because
no action or procedure had yet fixed the amount of recovery."'
The Verderame court's expanded application of Rodriguez is of questionable validity in light of the Pallas Shipping decision.III Although PallasShip-

ping explicitly resolves only the question of whether mere acceptance of compensation triggers section 33(b) assignment,' 20 an increasing number of courts
are interpreting PallasShipping as presenting an absolute standard' 2' that requires a longshoreman to receive, in all cases regardless of the circumstances,

an actual award in a compensation order before an assignment under section
33(b) is effective.' 22 The first circuit to render a decision based on PallasShipping, the Third Circuit, in Costa v. DanaisShipping Co., 23 interpreted Pallas

Shipping as adopting an absolute standard.'2 " In Costa, a longshoreman in-

jured aboard a third party vessel received LHWCA compensation pursuant

to a memorandum that a claims examiner filed, embodying a claims agreement which the longshoreman and his employer reached during an informal
conference.'

25

After termination of the agreed compensation payments, the

longshoreman sought further compensation, but a claims examiner determined
26

that the LHWCA entitled the longshoreman to no further compensation.'

The claims examiner, through another memorandum of informal conference,
placed the longshoreman's claim in an inactive file,' 27 whereafter the
approval of deputy commissioner following investigation of effect of settlement terms on rights
of employee).
117. 670 F.2d at 7.
118. Id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106 (Verderame decision effectively expanded
Rodriguez decision).
120. See PallasShipping, 461 U.S. at 531 (Supreme Court considered and decided question
whether longshoreman's acceptance of voluntary compensation payments triggers § 33(b) assignment); supra notes 43-83 and accompanying text (discussion and analysis of PallasShipping
decision).
121. See Costa v. Danais Shipping Co., 714 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1983) (interpreting Pallas
Shipping as requiring strict interpretation of compensation order requirement in § 33(b)); Brunetti
v. Cape Canaveral Shipping Co., 572 F. Supp. 854, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Palla Shipping adopts
strict interpretation of compensation order for purposes of § 33(b)).
122. See Costa v. Danais Shipping Co., 714 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1983) (PallasShipping standard requires nothing less than actual award in compensation order to satisfy § 33(b) award
requirement).
123. 714 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1983).
124. See id. at 4 (Costa court interpreted PallasShipping as requiring strict interpretation
of compensation order requirement in § 33(b)).
125. Id. at 1; see 20 C.F.R. § 702.315(a) (1983) (requiring deputy commissioner to file
memorandum embodying agreement reached in informal conference).
126. 714 F.2d at 2.
127. See id. (claims examiner's determination of no further entitlement to LHWCA compensation results in inactivity of employee's compensation claim, leading to referral of claim
to inactive file).
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longshoreman requested a formal hearing before an administrative law judge. 28
Before the hearing took place, however, the longshoreman brought suit against
the owner of the vessel aboard which the longshoreman received his injuries.' 2 9
The defendant shipowners motioned for dismissal on grounds that a section
33(b) assignment barred the longshoreman's claim because the longshoreman
instituted proceedings more than six months after the claims examiner filed
the memorandum placing the longshoreman's LHWCA claim in inactive
status. 30 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied
the shipowner's motion, reasoning that no assignment had occurred because
the memorandum of informal conference was not an award in a compensation order necessary to begin the six-month limitation period of section 33(b).' 3'
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, recognizing the PallasShipping decision as adopting a strict interpretation of the term
"compensation order."' 3 2 The defendant shipowners in Costa argued that an
informal conference memorandum constitutes the functional equivalent of a
compensation order because such a memorandum is subject to administrative
review, a quality the Supreme Court emphasized in Pallas Shipping as being
significant to the nature of a compensation order.' 3 3 The defendants based
their argument on a federal regulation which provides that if significant problems arise in an informal conference creating an impasse between the parties,
the disputed LHWCA claim advances to a formal hearing. '34 The defendants
contended that this advancement, in effect, constitutes a review of the informal conference.' 35 The Costa court, however, noted that federal regulations
did not authorize the deputy commissioner to transfer to an administrative
law judge for formal hearing any memoranda prepared pursuant to an informal conference. ' 36 The Third Circuit recognized that the Department of Labor
did not design formal hearings to review informal conferences, but rather,
to provide the claimant with a separate avenue by which to resolve his LHWCA
claim. 3 The Costa court, therefore, rejected the defendants' argument that
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.

132. Id. at 4; see supra notes 43-83 and accompanying text (discussion of PallasShipping
decision).

133. 714 F.2d at 3; see Pallas Shipping Agency v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529, 534 (1983) (distinguishing
administrative filings from compensation orders because Benefits Review Board may review latter but not former); supra note 18 (discussing nature and significance of compensation order).
134. 714 F.2d at 3; see 20 C.F.R. § 702.316 (1983) (claim advances to formal hearing if
serious dispute of fact or law arises in informal conference); supra notes 16-17 (discussing procedures for informal conferences and formal hearings).
135. 714 F.2d at 3.
136. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 702.317(c) (1983) (deputy commissioner transferring case to formal
heating may not include with informal conference any memoranda that deputy commissioner
prepared pursuant to informal conference); id. § 702.318 (deputy commissioner may not transfer
administrative file to formal hearing).
137. See 714 F.2d at 4 (formal hearing affords longshoreman second opportunity to present
evidence on claim and obtain favorable decision from administrative law judge).
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a memorandum is reviewable in the same manner that a compensation order

is reviewable,' 3 and concluded that anything less than an actual compensation order does not satisfy the requirement in section 33(b) of an award in
a compensation order.

39

Acknowledging PallasShippingas presenting an ab-

solute standard, the Costa court held that a memorandum of informal conference is not sufficient to trigger the section 33(b) six-month limitation because

the memorandum is not an award in a compensation order. 4
An absolute requirement under every circumstance of an award in a compensation order serves to remove all doubt concerning the finality of a LHWCA
claims agreement.' As the Costa court noted, the operation of section 33(b)
will be more effective if every party can be certain that one specific action
alone begins the six-month limitation period.' 42 An absolute standard intended
to remove all uncertainty in the application of section 33(b) has its merits
in comparison to the rule applied in the Fourth Circuit, until PallasShipping,

that section 33(b) requires merely payment and acceptance of compensation
to trigger a section 33(b) assignment." 3 The Fourth Circuit's application of
the section 33(b) compensation order requirement was so broad that it effectively created a large degree of uncertainty in the operation of section 33(b)

assignment."' In rejecting the Fourth Circuit's application of section 33(b),
however, the Supreme Court in Pallas Shipping may have responded too
rigorously to the problem of uncertainty in section 33(b)'s operation. 45
Pallas Shipping approves section 33(b) assignments only after a deputy

commissioner files a compensation order concluding either formal or informal administrative proceedings.' 46 If courts such as the Costa court continue
to apply the PallasShipping decision as presenting an absolute standard, the
138. See id. at 3-4 (discussing difference between Costa defendant's contention of reviewability
and PallasShipping Court's definition of reviewability); PallasShipping, 461 U.S. at 533 (defining review as act of Benefits Review Board occurring after conclusion of formal hearing); see
also 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1982) (authorizing review of compensation orders by Benefits Review
Board).
139. 714 F.2d at 4.
140. Id.
141. See id. (Costa court reasoned that strict interpretation of § 33(b) leaves no doubt among
longshoremen or employers concerning what action or procedure begins running of § 33(b) sixmonth limitation period).
142. Id.; see Brunetti v. Cape Canaveral Shipping Co., 572 F. Supp 854, 857 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (citing Costa acknowledging that strict § 33(b) interpretation allows certainty in application
of assignment provisions).
143. See Simmons v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 676 F.2d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1982) (longshoreman's
acceptance of payments without formal award sufficient to trigger assignment under § 33(b)),
vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3079 (1983); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564
F.2d 1097, 1103 (4th Cir. 1977) (longshoreman's acceptance of voluntary compensation and
employer's filing of notice sufficient to trigger § 33(b) six-month limitation period).
144. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's application of § 33(b)
assignment provision without regard for award requirement).
145. See infratext accompanying notes 147-56 (discussing effect of PallasShipping absolute
standard on Second Circuit functional equivalency rule).
146. 461 U.S. at 534.
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Second Circuit's broad allowance of a functional equivalent to a compensa-

tion order in Rodriguez and Verderame becomes untenable."4 7 This result is
not entirely desirable, especially considering the practical importance of the
Second Circuit's functional equivalency rule.II8 The Second Circuit's Rodriguez

decision allowed a section 33(b) assignment when a claims examiner, in a simple administrative lapse, failed to file a compensation order following a claims
agreement fixing the longshoreman's LHWCA benefits.149 To allow such an
administrative lapse to control the substantive rights of the parties, the

Rodriguez court reasoned, would exalt form over substance, possibly creating
an unreasonable result.' Rodriguez occurred in the context of a claims settlement following administrative proceedings requiring the entry of a compensation order.' The Second Circuit's expanded application of the Rodriguez

decision in Verderame'" extends to situations where an employer and a
longshoreman, outside of administrative proceedings and without dispute, agree

on a fixed amount of LHWCA compensation without entry of a compensation order. 3 The Second Circuit's expanded application of Rodriguez in
Verderame however, may extend too far beyond the PallasShipping decision
to warrant serious future consideration, especially in view of the PallasShipping Court's intent to promote certainty in the operation of the section 33(b)
assignment provision. "' Matched against the desire to provide certainty, none-

theless, is the rationale that an administrative error, like a claims examiner's
failure to file a compensation order when regulations required him to do so,
should not control the legal significance of a signed claims agreement to create

an unreasonable result."' If the Supreme Court's Pallas Shipping decision
147. See 714 F.2d at 4 (holding that anything less than actual award in compensation order
insufficient to meet § 33(b) award requirement). But cf. Verderame v. Torm Lines, 670 F.2d
5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982) (order, stipulation of parties, or informal award sufficient to meet § 33(b)
award requirement); Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 617 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1980) (informal equivalent of compensation order triggers § 33(b) assignment provisions), aff'd on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 596 (1981).
148. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (functional equivalency allows courts to avoid
possibly unreasonable results created by rigid application of § 33(b) award requirement).
149. Rodriguez, 617 F.2d at 959.
150. Id.; see supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text (discussion of Rodriguez decision).
151. 617 F.2d at 957.
152. See Verderame, 670 F.2d at 7 (order, stipulation of parties, or informal award sufficient to trigger § 33(b) six-month limitation period); supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text
(discussion of Verderame decision).
153. See 670 F.2d at 7 (action fixing longshoreman's compensation benefits serves purpose
of compensation order requirement and therefore is sufficient to trigger § 33(b) assignment);
supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (Verderame expanded Rodriguez decision).
154. Compare PallasShipping, 461 U.S. at 534 (award in compensation order necessary
to trigger § 33(b) six-month limitation period) with Verderame, 670 F.2d at 7 (order, stipulation
of parties, or informal award sufficient to begin running of § 33(b) six-month limitation); see
461 U.S. at 538 (PallasShipping notes significance of service of compensation order as certain
notice to longshoreman that six-month limitation period has begun).
155. See Rodriguez, 617 F.2d at 959 (failure of claims examiner to file required compensation order should have no significance concerning previously established substantive rights of
interested parties).
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presents an absolute requirement of an award in a compensation order, the
decision creates an inflexible rule that fails to accommodate the inevitable ad156
ministrative error like that in Rodriguez.
A narrow, revised applicatiorn of the Rodriguez functional equivalency
rationale may remain feasible, however, allowing an exception to a PallasShipping absolute standard that would apply in situations where an unreasonable
result would arise if a court were to comply literally with the section 33(b)
award provision as Pallas Shipping requires." 7 Other recent court decisions
have followed the Rodriguez functional equivalency rationale, a fact which
suggests that the Second Circuit's position is not an unreasonable application
of section 33(b)'s compensation order requirement. 5 Additionally, when the
Supreme Court in 1982 denied certiorari on a section 33(b) case from the Fourth
Circuit,1 59 the two dissenting justices indicated that they were prepared to resolve
156. See PallasShipping, 461 U.S. at 534 (six-month limitation cannot begin until deputy
commissioner enters award in compensation order); Costa, 714 F.2d at 4 (PallasShipping requires nothing less than award in compensation order for running of § 33(b) six-month limitation
period); see also Rodriguez, 617 F.2d at 957 (simple administrative lapse resulted in failure of
entry of compensation order concluding informal conference).
157. See infra text accompanying note 161 (explaining possible future application of functional equivalency rationale as exception to Pallas Shipping absolute requirement of compensation award).
158. See, e.g., D'Amico v. Compania De Nay. Mar. Netumar, 677 F.2d 249, 251 (2d Cir.
1982) (action that in practical and legal effect constitutes award in compensation order satisfies
requirement of compensation order under § 33(b)); Ambrosino v. Transoceanic S.S. Co., 675
F.2d 470, 472 (2d Cir. 1982) (agreement reached at informal conference fixing employee's LHWCA
compensation constitutes award in compensation order for purposes of § 33(b)); Verderame v.
Torm Lines, 670 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1980) (order, stipulation of parties, or informal award must
fix longshoreman's LHWCA benefits to trigger running of § 33(b) six-month limitation); Rodriguez
v. Compass Shipping Co., 617 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1980) (when signed agreement apprises
employee of full rights to compensation, absence of compensation order is immaterial in operation of § 33(b) assignment provision), aff'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 596 (1981); Keller v.
United States, 557 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (D.N.H. 1983) (order, stipulation of parties, or informal
award must fix longshoreman's full rights to LHWCA compensation to trigger § 33(b) assignment provision); Hall v. International Union Lines, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 816, 819 (E.D. La. 1982)
(suggesting that agreement, stipulation of parties, or informal order may trigger § 33(b) assignment if such action settles employee's LHWCA claim); Rother v. Interstate & Ocean Transp.
Co., 540 F. Supp. 477, 485-86 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (formal order or even approved settlement agreement may provide longshoreman with full notice of his rights to compensation, but when no
action has resolved longshoreman's claim, § 33(b) assignment cannot operate); Klitznsky v. Pakistan
Shipping Corp., 530 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (absence of formal action by deputy
commissioner or informal official action providing longshoreman with notice of full extent of
rights to compensation precludes operation of § 33(b) assignment provision); Dunbar v. Retla
S.S. Co., 484 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (some proceeding must function as indication
that longshoreman knew full extent of his rights to compensation before § 33(b) assignment
operates); Panzella v. Skou, 471 F. Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (memorandum issued pursuant to informal conference settling longshoreman's LHWCA claim constitutes award for purposes of § 33(b) in absence of actual compensation order); Francavilla v. Bank Line, Ltd., 470
F. Supp. 94, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (informal conference concluded with memorandum settling
longshoreman's LHWCA claim sufficient to trigger § 33(b) assignment provisions).
159. See Simmons, 676 F.2d 106 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 931 (1982), vacated and
remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3079 (1983).
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the section 33(b) award issue between the two alternative section 33(b) applications presented by the Second and Fourth Circuits. 6 The functional equivalency argument, therefore, is a widely-accepted idea that may possess
continued vitality as a narrow exception to Pallas Shipping, especially when
applied to cases in which a literal application of the section 33(b) compensation order requirement would itself produce an unreasonable result. 6'
Although the Supreme Court in Pallas Shipping may leave unanswered
questions posed by the Second Circuit's assertion of a functional equivalency
scheme,' 62 the Pallas Shipping decision resolves a basic question concerning
section 33(b) assignment. In PallasShipping, the Supreme Court rejected the

Fourth Circuit's determination that a longshoreman's acceptance of voluntarily paid LHWCA compensation and the filing of routine LHWCA forms
constituted an award in a compensation order for purposes of section 33(b).' 63
Additionally, the Pallas Shipping Court implicitly limited section 33(b)
assignments to those situations in which some form of agreement fixing compensation concludes with the actual entry of an award in a compensation
order.' 64 The Pallas Shipping decision, therefore, may create an absolute

standard requiring under every circumstance the entry of an award in a compensation order before assignment under section 33(b) is possible.' 6 A broad
Second Circuit functional equivalency argument consistent with Pallas Shipping is not feasible, especially in view of the PallasShipping Court's emphasis
on the literal form of an award requirement' 6 6 rather than on the function
of an award requirement. 67 The Third Circuit, basing its decision in Costa

on Pallas Shipping, implicitly rejected the functional equivalency argument
expounded by the Second Circuit.

68

Whether other circuits will follow the

160. See Simmons, 459 U.S. 931, 931-32 (1982) (White, O'Connor, J.J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that § 33(b) conflict between Second and Fourth Circuits warrants resolution).

161. See supra notes 158-60 (extent of acceptance of functional equivalency rule as alternative to absolute standard in application of § 33(b) award requirement).
162. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (Supreme Court in Pallas Shipping did
not explicitly address Second Circuit functional equivalency rationale).
163. 461 U.S. at 532.
164. See id. at 534 (Pallas Shipping Court's emphasis on literal requirement of award in
compensation order indicates strict interpretation of § 33(b) award provision); supra notes 54-58
and accompanying text (discussing PallasShipping Court's emphasis on actual language of §
33(b) requiring award in compensation order).
165. See Costa v. Danais Shipping Co., 714 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1983) (interpreting Pallas
Shipping as requiring strict application of § 33(b) requirement of award in compensation order);
Brunetti v. Cape Canaveral Shipping Co., 572 F. Supp. 854, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (following

Costa in interpreting Pallas Shipping as requiring strict interpretation of § 33(b) award requirement).
166. See 461 U.S. at 534 (PallasShipping Court emphasized literal requirement of award
in compensation order).
167. See 461 U.S. at 534, 536 (Pallas Shipping Court acknowledged function of award re-

quirement but based reasoning more heavily on literal form of award requirement as set forth
in § 33(b)).
168. See Costa v. Danais Shipping Co., 714 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1983) (interpretation of Pallas
Shipping as requiring strict interpretation of award requirement in § 33(b) precludes further vitality
of Second Circuit functional equivalency rule).
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Third Circuit's lead in interpreting Pallas Shipping as creating an absolute
standard,' 69 or permit an exception to Pallas Shipping grounded loosely on
the Second Circuit's functional equivalency test is still uncertain. 1 0
DOUGLAS G. STANFORD

169. See id. (Costa court's interpretation of PallasShipping as requiring strict interpretation
of § 33(b) award requirement creates absolute standard); see also Brunetti v. Cape Canaveral
Shipping Co., 572 F. Supp. 854, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (following Costa court's absolute standard
for application of § 33(b) award requirement); MacKenzie v. Caldwell Shipping Co., 561 F. Supp.
739, 740 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (deputy commissioner's entry of formal award necessary to trigger
§ 33(b) six-month limitation).
170. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (Rodriguez functional equivalency rule may
possess continued vitality as narrow exception to PallasShipping rule in appropriate circumstances).

